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The framework of low-cost interconnected devices forms a new kind of cryptographic
environment with diverse requirements. Due to the minimal resource capacity of the
devices, light-weight cryptographic algorithms are favored. Many applications of IoT
work autonomously and process sensible data, which emphasizes security needs, and
might also cause a need for specic security measures.
A bilinear pairing is a mapping based on groups formed by elliptic curves over extension
elds. The pairings are the key-enabler for versatile cryptosystems, such as certicate-
less signatures and searchable encryption. However, they have a major computational
overhead, which coincides with the requirements of the low-cost devices. Nonetheless,
the bilinear pairings are the only known approach for many cryptographic protocols so
their feasibility should certainly be studied, as they might turn out to be necessary for
some future IoT solutions. Promising results already exist for high-frequency CPU:s
and platforms with hardware extensions.
In this work, we study the feasibility of computing the optimal ate pairing over the
BN254 curve, on a 64 MHz Cortex-M33 based platform by utilizing an optimized open-
source library. The project is carried out for the company Nordic Semiconductor. As
a result, the pairing was eectively computed in under 26 · 106 cycles, or in 410 ms.
The resulting pairing enables a limited usage of pairing-based cryptography, with a
capacity of at most few cryptographic operations, such as ID-based key verications
per second. Referring to other relevant works, a competent pairing application would
require either a high-frequency  and thus high consuming  microprocessor, or a
customized FPGA. Moreover, it is noted that the research in ecient pairing-based
cryptography is constantly taking steps forward in every front-line: ecient algorithms,
protocols, and hardware-solutions.
Keywords: pairing-based cryptography, embedded platform, optimal ate pairing
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The emerging eld of interconnected, smart devices has posed new challenges in the
eld of information security. The embedded devices are usually very small-scale and
endowed with constrained resources, which limits the usage of security algorithms.
Low-weight protocols utilizing elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) are adopted as the
main component for accomplishing security. The devices may handle sensitive data,
and the composed applications might have special requirements, comparing to the
usual computer networks.
In cryptography, the concept of bilinear pairing was originally brought forth in 1993,
in the form of MOV-attack [27] which exploits pairings to attack the elliptic curve pro-
tocols that utilize a specic class of curves. However, after a two decades of research,
it has turned out that bilinear pairings enable a novel class of cryptographic applica-
tions. These include the identity based encrypiton [11], various certicateless signature
schemes, searchable encryption [26], a signcryption in wireless sensor networks [19],
and many other applications with interesting properties.
A major bottleneck in the pairing implementations is posed by the massive runtime
and resource requirements of the computations. Consequently, a lot of research con-
tribution has been given to algorithmic, arithmetic and implementation issues of the
pairings. Research has attained the implementations on constrained, embedded plat-
forms. A single pairing has been computed in 3.88ms, with a 1.2 GHz Rasberry Pi3
platform [22]. Even smart card implementations have been presented [17]. However,
the majority of the implementations for the ultra-low-power devices are quite imprac-
tical, taking hundreds of milliseconds to compute a single pairing.
The pairings oer unique, new kind of security mechanisms, which would be dicult,
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if not impossible, to construct with other known cryptographic primitives. Hence the
possibility of using them in embedded platform should certainly be studied. The ac-
celerating increase of interconnected devices and new kinds of applications will pose
new challenges on information security and privacy, which may emerge a need for
novel kinds of security protocols. This is where the pairing protocols might show
their signicance. Pairing-based cryptography has already found innovative applica-
tions in various systems, such as in Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT)[34], wearable
technologies and health record systems [25] and sensor networks [19].
1.1 Thesis Objective and Research Questions
The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the performance of optimal ate pairing over
the BN254 curve in resource-constrained single microprocessor embedded platform.
The study gives a reference for the feasibility of pairing-based cryptography on a low-
cost general-purpose embedded platform. The pairings enable novel kinds of security
features in IoT and other embedded solutions, which gives a reason to study them.
The main research problem of the thesis is studying the feasibility of optimal ate pairing
in a resource-constrained single microprocessor platform. The problem is divided into
three research questions: 1) is the computation of optimal ate-pairing in constrained
microprocessor feasible? 2) does the resulting pairing enable adopting the pairing-
based protocols and related approaches? 3) how the existing implementation could be
further enhanced?
1.2 Thesis Structure
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapters 2-3 form the preliminary theory part,
including requisite cryptography, mathematical fundamentals  such as elds and
elliptic curves, and ultimately the topic of pairing-based cryptography. Elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC) is presented shortly. Chapter 4 covers the key methodology
for ecient pairing computations, focusing on the methods adopted in this work.
In chapter 5, our proposed implementation and results are presented, in addition to
a discussion of the further improvements and the current situation of pairing-based
cryptography. Chapter 6 contains the conclusions.
2
Chapter 2
Some Preliminary Concepts
This chapter starts by outlining the preliminary terminology and concepts behind the
bilinear pairings. The rst section gives a brief overview of cryptographic terminology,
with emphasis on relevant themes. The second section introduces some necessary
mathematical concepts that are in a key role in understanding the concept of elliptic
curve cryptography, and furthermore the bilinear pairings. The third section contains
the elliptic curve subject. It introduces the elliptic curves over nite elds and discusses
briey their security and usage in cryptography.
2.1 Overview of Cryptography
Cryptography is the science and study of methodology for secure communication over
an insecure channel. The goal is to fulll condentiality, integrity, authenticationn
and non-repudiation of information, or transactions. Condentiality is fullled with
encryption of the data, making it uninterpretable for unauthorized parties. Integrity
is accomplished with checksums and digital signatures, which ensure that the data has
not been altered by a third party. Authentication, and in some cases, non-repudiation
is fullled with digital signatures and Message Authentication Codes (MACs), which
ensure that certain transaction is indisputably performed by a certain party.[33]
Encryption is a process of transforming a plain text into apparent noise, ciphertext.
Decryption is the reversal process, converting the ciphertext back into readable form.
A key is closely related to cryptographic processes, such as message encryption and
performing digital signing. The keyspace is the set of all possible keys. Cryptanalysis,
in turn, is the science of breaking cryptographic systems. It can refer to nding out
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the secret key or reversing the cryptographic process without the required key.[33]
Cryptography is usually divided into symmetric and asymmetric algorithms, and into
dierent cryptographic protocols. In a symmetric algorithms, one secret key is used for
both encryption and decryption of data. Asymmetric algorithms rather incorporate
a key pair, of which one key is public and one is kept secret. They are also known
as public-key algorithms. Cryptographic protocols deal with the actual applications,
employing both symmetric and asymmetric techniques.[33] In this document, a set of
algorithms for achieving a certain security attribute is called a cryptosystem.
Symmetric algorithms are mainly used for data encryption and integrity verifying algo-
rithms. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is one of the most common symmetric
ciphers1. Public-key algorithms have more versatile applications. Public-key cryptog-
raphy addresses two fundamental problems  secure distribution of the secret value
over an insecure channel, and the creation of unforgeable digital signatures. With a
key distribution protocol, the actual key for message encryption can be exchanged over
an untrusted channel. Digital signatures, as mentioned, provide authentication and
non-repudiation for a piece of information or action. Public-key systems are also capa-
ble of encryption and verifying integrity, but they are primarily used in key exchange
and signature-generating. Common public-key algorithms are RSA, ElGamal and the
elliptic curve-based systems.[33]
2.2 Security of Cryptosystems
Security of a cryptosystem is dependent on the keyspace but more importantly of the
complexity of the equivalent hard problem that is needed to be solved in order to break
the system. The cryptographic operation should be infeasible2 to be inverted without
knowledge of the secret key. Similarly, the information generated by the cryptographic
process should not reveal any information about the key. A secure cryptosystem should
have resilience against all known applicable methods of cryptanalysis.
The principle behind public-key cryptosystems is the one-way property. A function
f : X → Y fullls the one-way property if f(x) = y can be eciently computed for any
x ∈ X, but solving f−1(y) = x is computationally infeasible. Meaning that the x ∈ X
for corresponding f(x) = y ∈ Y cannot be found in polynomial time. In practice,
1A cipher is here dened as a pair of algorithms; for encryption and decryption
2Infeasibility is here loosely dened as "no ecient attempts or methods known to compute or
solve a problem in polynomial time".
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the one-way property is accomplished with a certain dicult problem, which has a
back door  a secret piece of information for inverting the function.[33] Examples
of one-way properties (and corresponding cryptosystems based on it) are the discrete
logarithm problem (ElGamal), integer factorization problem (RSA) and elliptic curve
discrete logarithm problem (ECC and bilinear pairings).[23]
Cryptosystems are also vulnerable to physical attacks, which take advantage of leaked
information of the physical implementation of the system. By monitoring some by-
product generated by the corresponding device, an adversary might gather information
about the internal state or operations, and thus, piece-by-piece, construct the secret
key.
As mentioned in [30], physical attacks against elliptic curve based systems are di-
vided into Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) and fault attacks. Attacks based on SCA
utilize leaked power traces, timing, and electromagnetic radiation. For instance, Sim-
ple Power Analysis-attack (SPA) makes use of key-dependent patterns that occur on
power traces, which can be used to deduce information about the key. Calculations
with dummy variables can be used to reduce the predictability of the process to some
extend. However, the usage of dummy calculations poses another weakness. In fault
attacks, the adversary aims to disturb the cipher to derive secrets by injecting faults
during certain computation phases. Faults can be induced with glitches in the clock
or with a laser beamer, for instance. An error induced during dummy calculation can
reveal parts of the secret key.[30]
2.3 Some Mathematical Prerequisites
Foundations of abstract algebra provide the basis for the majority of public-key cryp-
tosystems, as well as for ECC and pairing-based protocols. As the focus of this thesis
is more on practical side, a detailed mathematical presentation and derivation of the
cryptographic structures is not appropriate. However, the very essential theory is
presented in a non-rigorous manner. The goal is that a reader with a minor mathe-
matical background gets a brief overview of the necessary mathematical elements for
understanding the elliptic curves and bilinear pairings adequately.
This section includes basics of groups and elds, compressed in under three pages, and
some distinct notions. The main source for this section is [30] and [39] which can be
referred for further information.
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The notion of a group is a constitutive building block in cryptography.
Group (G, ◦) is a set of elements G endowed with a binary operation ◦ that satises
the following properties:
1. Group is closed under the group operation ◦, i.e. ◦ : G×G→ G.
2. Operation ◦ is associative: (a ◦ b) ◦ c = a ◦ (b ◦ c) ∀a, b, c ∈ G.
3. Exists an unique neutral element e ∈ G such that a ◦ e = e ◦ a = a ∀a ∈ G.
4. Each element a ∈ G has an inverse a−1 ∈ G for which a ◦ a−1 = a−1 ◦ a = e.
If also a ◦ b = b ◦ a for all a, b ∈ G, the group is Abelian, or commutative. Groups can
be nite or innite. In this document, only nite groups are considered. The size, also
called order of a group G is denoted as #G.[30]
Some common groups are Zn = {0, 1, 2, . . . , n−1} (integers modulo n) under addition,
and Z∗n = {a ∈ Zn | gcd(a, n) = 1} under multiplication.
If a certain set H ⊂ G is a group under the restriction of binary operation dened on
G, then H is a subgroup of G, denoted as H < G. Every element a ∈ G generates a
subgroup of G. This subgroup is composed of elements constructed from a, applying
the group operation consecutively. The size of the subgroup generated by a is denoted
as ord(a), which refers to the order of the element a.[30] The next theorem gives
valuable information about subgroups.
Theorem 2.1 ([30]). Lagrange's Theorem. Let G be a nite group. If H is a subgroup
of G, then the order of H divides the order of G, i.e. #H|#G. In other words, if
g ∈ G, then ord(g)|#G.
As a consequence, the groups with prime order, i.e. #G = p ∈ P, have only trivial
subgroups: the group G itself and the trivial group {1}.
If a group G is generated by one element a, it is called cyclic, and is denoted as
〈a〉 = G. Subgroups of cyclic groups are cyclic. I.e. if G = 〈g〉 and H < G, then
∃k ∈ Z, 〈gk〉 = H.[30] This gives an intuition to the fact that the order ord(a) can
be thought as the smallest positive integer h for which a ◦ a ◦ · · · ◦ a︸ ︷︷ ︸
h times
= 1, where 1 is
the identity element of the group. The following theorem completely characterizes the
subgroups of a (nite) cyclic group.
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Theorem 2.2 ([33]). Let G = 〈g〉 be nite cyclic group, with #G = n. For every
m ∈ Z such that m|n exists a subgroup H ≤ G of order m. This subgroup is generated
as 〈gn/m〉. There are no other subgroups.
Cryptosystems based on cyclic groups are usually endowed with a strong one-way
property called Discrete logarithm problem (DLP). If α◦α◦· · ·◦α = β (group operation
◦ is applied k times), the DLP is to nd the corresponding k.[33] In other words, solving
logα β = k. The logarithm here is quite ambiguous as it depends of the used group
operation. Usually the question of interest is to solve DLP in the multiplicative group,
i.e. αk ≡ β (mod p) for some integer k. The most ecient known method for solving
DLP in Z∗p is the index calculus method which has a sub-exponential time complexity.
DLP for elliptic curves is revisited in chapter 3.1.
Denition 2.1 ([30]). Homomorphisms. Let (G, ∗) and (G′, ◦) be groups. The map-
ping f : G→ G′ is called a homomorphism if f(a∗ b) = f(a)◦f(b) for all a, b ∈ G. In
other words, the mapping f takes the operations in G to the corresponding operations
in G′. The kernel of f is Ker(f) = {a ∈ G | f(a) = 0} = f−1({0}) and the image of
f is f(G).
If the mapping f is bijective, the groups G and G′ are isomorphic  denoted as
G ' G′.[30]
Arithmetic over nite elds is employed in elliptic curve cryptosystems, and conse-
quently in bilinear pairings.
Denition 2.2 ([30]). Field. A triplet (F,+, ·) is a eld if following properties satisfy:
1. (F,+) is Abelian group with a neutral element 0.
2. (F \ {0}, ·) = (F ∗, ·) is Abelian group with a neutral element 1.
3. Distributivity law holds: ∀a, b, c ∈ F : a(b+ c) = (ab) + (ac).
A eld can be thought as a group with some additional properties. In elliptic curve
cryptography and bilinear pairs, large (but nite) elds and a certain eld extensions
are involved. Next, the basic outline of these elds and their structures is given in a
simplied form.
Majority of elliptic curve cryptography is based on two elds: the prime eld and the
binary eld. A prime eld, with respect to certain prime p is denoted as
Fp = Z/pZ = {0, 1, 2, . . . , p− 1}.
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Which is similar to the group Zm dened earlier, but with m = p ∈ P. The notation
G/N refers to a quotient ring.[30]
The binary eld is actually a eld extension. Field extensions Fpn , where p ∈ P and
n ∈ N \ {0} are constructed with irreducible polynomials. Polynomial f(x) ∈ K[x] =
{a0 + a1x + . . . + anxn | n ≥ 0, ai ∈ K} is irreducible if and only if f(x) is neither
a constant polynomial nor a product of two polynomials of positive degree. Let n be
the degree of irreducible polynomial f(x), then the prime eld extension is dened as
Fpn = {a0 + a1x+ a2x2 + · · ·+ an−1xn−1 | ai ∈ Fp, f(x) = 0}
If p = 2, then the prime eld extension is a binary eld, with coecients from F2 =
{0, 1}.[23] An element of a binary eld can be interpret as a binary string. For instance,
x12 + x9 + x5 + x + 1 corresponds to a 13 bit value 1001000100011. Consequently,
arithmetic of the binary eld elements is eciently carried out with logical operations.
Example 1. In a prime eld Fp, the equality (a + b)p = ap + bp applies. This is
easily proven as (a+ b)p = ap + bp +
∑p−1
k=1
(
p
k
)
akbp−k ≡ ap + bp (mod p). This property
simplies exponentiation over prime elds and eld extensions.
Example 2. Example of addition and multiplication over a prime eld extension F25 =
{a0 + a1x+ a2x2 + a3x3 + a4x4 | ai ∈ {0, 1}, 1 + x+ x5 = 0}.
As x5 + x + 1 = 0, x5 is reduced to x + 1 in computations, recalling that −1 ≡ 1 and
2 ≡ 0 in F2. Now proceeding the computation with two elements of F25:
(x3 + x2 + 1) + (x3 + x2) = 1
(x3 + x2 + 1) · (x3 + x2) = x6 + x5 + x5 + x4 + x3 + x2
= x · x5 + x4 + x3 + x2
= x(x+ 1) + x4 + x3 + x2
= x4 + x3 + x
Let K and L be elds such that K ⊆ L. Element α ∈ L is said to be algebraic over
K, if there exists a non-constant polynomial f(x) = xn + an−1x
n−1 + . . . + a0, with
a0, . . . , an−1 ∈ K, such that f(α) = 0. If every element of L is algebraic over K, then
L is an algebraic extension of K.[39]
Denition 2.3 ([39]). Algebraic closure. An algebraic closure of a eld K is a eld
K̄, K ⊂ K̄ such that
1. K̄ is algebraic extension of K
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2. Every non-constant polynomial f(x) with coecients in K̄ has a root in K̄. In
other words: K̄ is algebraically closed.
Example 3. Field R is not an algebraic closure, as the polynomial x2 + 1 = 0 has no
roots over the eld of real numbers.
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2.4 Elliptic Curves over Finite Fields
The insight of using elliptic curves in cryptography was formed in the middle '80s,
independently by two researchers Neal Koblitz and Victor Miller [24, 29]. After two
decades of research, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is standardized and widely
used. ECC is based on the foundation that elliptic plane curves over nite elds form
an Abelian group, under a certain geometric operation. This allows group-theoretic
machinery to be applied, resulting in ecient and secure cryptographic protocols.
Elliptic curves provide ecient tools for key agreement, digital signatures, but also
for non-cryptographic applications, such as integer factorization. Besides, groups over
elliptic curves form the basis for all known bilinear pairings. The ECC protocols have
many advantages compared to prior public key protocols. Whilst fullling the same
security level as RSA, they oer more ecient implementations and smaller key sizes.
The main sources for this section are [23], [39], [30] and [7].
The Elliptic Curve concept originates from an idea of combining geometric properties
of elliptic curves and calculations over nite elds. The eld elements satisfying the
elliptic curve-equation form an Abelian group. The elliptic curve E is dened by a
non-singular generalized Weierstrass equation over a nite eld K as
y2 + a1xy + a2y = x
3 + a3x
2 + a4x+ a5, ai ∈ K. (2.1)
An elliptic curve is thereby dened by the set of points (x, y) ∈ K2 satisfying the
curve equation (2.1), and is denoted by E(K). Weierstrass equation is the generalized
version of elliptic curves. With a linear change of variables, variants of the curve (2.1)
can be derived for dierent elds, and dierent applications. In case of a prime eld
(p 6= 3), the equation has a form of
y2 = x3 + ax+ b (2.2)
where a, b ∈ Fp, and ∆ = −4a3 − 27b2 6= 0.[23]
In case of binary eld, the equation is:
y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b (2.3)
where a, b ∈ F2m , and it is further required that ∆ = b 6= 0. This curve is labeled as
the binary curve.[23]
The curves above are of Short-Weierstrass form. The discriminant property ∆ 6= 0
ensures that the roots of the elliptic curve are distinct, i.e. the curve does not contain
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"bad points" such as cusps or self-intersections. By the denition, this non-singularity
is required for a curve to be an elliptic curve.[33]
2.4.1 The Group Structure
An elliptic curve is dened as the set of coordinates (elements of K) on the plane curve
E as follows:
E(K) = {(x, y) ∈ E : x, y ∈ K} ∪ {O} (2.4)
As will be shown, E(K) forms a group under the dened geometric operation. The
point O is called a point at innity  a point to innitely far on the y-axis. It is used
as the neutral element of the group.[23]
The additive group operation ⊕ is called chord-tangent process. The process is best
visualized with a picture (see g. 2.1). A straight line through P and Q is formed, as
y = λx + ν, and its intersection with the curve E is calculated. The resulting point
P ⊕ Q locates on the opposite intersection point of the curve.[39] It should be noted
that in nite elds, the curve is a set of scattered points, as depicted in gure (2.2).
Figure 2.1: Chord-tangent process
Next, the formation of the group operation will be studied more in detail, based on [39].
The group operations are presented for ane coordinates. First let P = (x1, y1) 6= O
and Q = (x2, y2) 6= O be two points on the curve y2 = x3 + ax+ b, over a prime eld
(p > 3). Let us now proceed with the aforementioned geometrical steps in terms of
computations for P ⊕Q = (x3, y3).
First, the chord y = λx + ν, connecting P to Q is computed. The slope of the line y
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is calculated as
λ =

y2 − y1
x2 − x1
if P 6= Q
3x21 + a
2y1
if P = Q
(2.5)
and ν = y1 − λx1. Note that if P = Q, λ represents the tangent of the curve at point
P = (x1, y1), and is thus derived by implicit dierentiation of the curve equation.
Now substituting the equation of the chord to the eq. 2.2 gives (λ+νx)2 = x3 +ax+b.
As x1 and x2 are known solutions of x
3 + ax+ b− (λ+ νx)2 = 0, the third solution x3
is easily found: x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2. Therefore y3 = −λx3 − ν, and nally
P ⊕Q = (x3, y3) = (λ2 − x1 − x2, λ(x1 − x3)− y1). (2.6)
It can be shown that group rules are satised under this group operation: P⊕(Q⊕R) =
(P ⊕Q)⊕R and P ⊕Q = Q⊕P for all P,Q,R ∈ E (associativity and commutativity
of the group); P ⊕ O = O ⊕ P = P and P ⊕ (−P ) = (−P ) ⊕ P = O for any
P ∈ E (identity and inverse elements of a group). Therefore, (E,⊕) indeed forms
an Abelian group. For rigorous proofs for group rules, one may refer to [39]. The
obtained formulas apply in prime elds as-is. For other types of elds and equations,
the operations are derived in a similar fashion. In example 4, the group operation on
a curve over F19 is illustrated.
The scalar multiplication kP on Elliptic curve E is dened as k repeated additions of
a point P ∈ E to itself: kP = P ⊕P ⊕ . . .⊕P . Order of an element P is the smallest
positive integer n for which nP = O.[39]
Theorem 2.3 ([39]). (Hasse's Theorem). Let E be an elliptic curve over the eld K
with q elements. Then the size of an elliptic curve E has the following bounds:
(
√
q − 1)2 ≤ #E(K) ≤ (√q + 1)2.
Inequality can be written as |#E(K)− (q+ 1)| ≤ 2√q where #E(K)− (q+ 1) is also
known as the trace of frobenius. It is worth noting that Hasse's theorem only gives
bounds for the size of E  the exact number of points is rather dicult to determine.
One of the most ecient methods for point computation is the Schoof's algorithm [35],
which has a complexity of O(log8 q).
Denition 2.4 ([39]). n-torsion points. Let E(K) be an elliptic curve and n be a
positive integer. The set of n-torsion points of E is dened as:
E[n] = {P ∈ E(K̄) | nP = O},
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where K̄ is the algebraic closure of K. More precisely, the set E[n] contains points of
elliptic curve that have a nite order.
Torsion points are namely the points that have nite order. In terms of nite elds,
every point is a torsion point.3[39]
Elliptic curves E(Fq), where q = pk are called supersingular, if E(Fq)[p] = {O} i.e.
the curve has no points of order p. This is equivalent to p | #E(Fq)− (q + 1), i.e. the
trace of Frobenius is a multiple of p. If #E(Fq) = q, i.e. the trace of Frobenius is 1,
the elliptic curve is called anomalous.[39]
Supersingular and anomalous curves are considered cryptographically weak.[39] Su-
persingular curves are vulnerable to the MOV-attack [27] which is described briey in
chapter 4.1. Anomalous curves have low resilience against DLP over elliptic curves.
Supersingular curves are, however, employed in some use cases. Note: supersingularity
is not to be confused with singularity, which was dened in the section 3.1.
Example 4. Considering an elliptic curve E : y2 = x3 − 7x + 10 over a small prime
eld F19. All the points (x, y) ∈ F219 satisfying E, i.e. solutions for y2 ≡ x3 − 7x+ 10
(mod 19) are:
(1, 2) (5, 9) (10, 16) (16, 17)
(1, 17) (5, 10) (12, 1) (17, 4)
(2, 2) (7, 0) (12, 18) (17, 15)
(2, 17) (9, 7) (13, 8) (18, 4)
(3, 4) (9, 12) (13, 11) (18, 15)
(3, 15) (10, 3) (16, 2) O
24 points on E are found (including the neutral element O), which is within Hasse's
bounds as 11 < (
√
19− 1)2 ≤ #E(F19) ≤ (
√
19 + 1)2 < 29.
Let P = (13, 11), Q = (17, 15), P,Q ∈ E(F19). Now P ⊕Q = (x3, y3) can be computed
using the equations (2.5) and (2.6).
As P 6= Q, λ = 15−11
17−13 = 4 · 4
−1 = 1. Hence x3 = 1
2 − 13 − 17 ≡ 9 (mod 19) and
y3 = 1 · (13 − 9) − 11 ≡ 12 (mod 19). Thus P ⊕ Q = (9, 12). The group operation is
visualized in the gure (2.2) below.
3But there might be no points in E[n] for each n ∈ Fp.
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Figure 2.2: Chord-tangent process on a curve over F19
2.4.2 Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
As the elliptic curve cryptography is based on cyclic groups, the computation of discrete
logarithm is also the underlying hard problem of the protocol. But as the group
operation on elliptic curves is dierent, the problem of interest is appointed as Elliptic
Curve DLP (ECDLP). For elliptic curves, the problem is to solve the coecient k in
scalar multiplication kG = G⊕G⊕ . . .⊕G = P , while knowing the base point G and
P ∈ 〈G〉.[23]
With a proper choice of the curve, the best algorithms for ECDLP are the generic
DL algorithms, that work on arbitrary cyclic groups. Such methods, for example, the
Pollard's rho algorithm can compute generic DLP probabilistically in at most O(
√
n)
steps.[23]
2.5 Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
Elliptic curve protocols have remarkable advantages over the other respective public-
key systems in terms of key size and performance. Considering a 3072-bit RSA key,
the corresponding security level is obtained with only 256-bit ECC key.[23] Another
advantage within ECC are the standardized curves and parameters; the user only needs
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to generate a random number s as the private key. In RSA, the security specically
relies on the generated parameters. That is, two strong primes with a size over 1000
bits must always be generated and kept secret, when deploying the cryptosystem.
In Elliptic Curve protocols, the system parameters are the used prime p for a prime
eld, or m in case of binary eld F2m ; constants a and b dening the curve, and the
generator point G, and its order r. Private key of the user is a random integer s ∈ Zr.
Public key is the point Q = sG. If a binary eld is used, the generator polynomial f
is also included.[7] In this section, two common elliptic curve protocols are presented:
the elliptic curve variant of Die-Hellman (ECDH) and elliptic curve digital signature
protocol (ECDLP).
Elliptic Curve Die-Hellman
The Die-Hellman protocol allows secret key exchange over an insecure channel. Dur-
ing the process, certain pieces of public information are transmitted over the channel,
which is then combined with at least one piece of secret information to obtain the
key. A possible eavesdropper can not obtain the key, as he neither possesses the secret
piece(s) of the information nor is capable to compute it from the public information.
The process is also known as key-agreement.[39]
Elliptic curve version of Die-Hellman (ECDH) uses the scalar multiplication of an
elliptic curve point as the operation. The particular nite eld Fq, the curve E over
it, and a generator point G and its order r are known to communication parties A and
B. Now the secret key is computed as follows:
1. A and B individually generate random integers a, b ∈ Z∗r, and compute P = aG
and Q = bG respectively.
2. A sends P to B and B sends Q to A.
3. A and B compute the point aQ = a(bG) = b(aG) = bP (commutativity of E
is used). The shared secret key is the extracted x-coordinate of the generated
point.
Now nding the (ab)G = k would require the eavesdropper to solve either a or b from
k, which is known as Die-Hellman problem. The problem is, according to the current
knowledge, computationally equivalent to solving the DLP.[39]
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Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
Let E(Fq) be an elliptic curve, G ∈ E a generator point, and r = ord(G). The
parameters are assumed known to communication parties. Also let s ∈ Z∗r be the
private key and Q = sG public key of communication party A. Now, A signs a
message as follows:
1. A computes the hash h(m) of a message, with an agreed hash algorithm.
2. A selects a random, secret integer k ∈ Z∗r, computes the point P = kG and ex-
tracts its x-coordinate as an integer c using a simple, pre-determined conversion
function.
3. The signature is the pair (c, d) where d ≡ k−1(h+ sc) (mod r).
Any other party B is now able to verify the signature of A for message m as follows:
1. B computes h = h(m) with the same hash function as used in signing process.
2. B, knowing the public key Q, calculates the point R = d−1(hG+cQ) and extracts
its x-coordinate as an integer c′.
3. B accepts the signature if c′ = c.
Signature verication works, as
R = d−1(hG+ cQ) = (k−1(h+ sc))−1(hG+ scG) = k(h+ sc)−1(h+ sc)G = kG,
which equals the point calculated by A in the signing process. For an attacker to
counterfeit the signature of A, solving the secret key s from Q = sG is required. This
equals, again, solving the ECDLP.[23]
It is clear that r 6= 0 6= s. Also, notable is that k is considered to be a NONCE (Number
used ONCE), and must be kept secret. If corresponding k for a certain message m is
revealed, the secret key can be computed as s = c−1(dk− h(m)) (mod r). If the same
random k is used more than once with two dierent messages h(m1) and h(m2), it can
be solved. Considering k = d−1i (h(mi) + sci), for signatures i = 1, 2 with equivalent
k:s. As k1 = k2 result into c1 = c2, it follows that k ≡ (d1 − d2)−1(h(m1) − h(m2)).
Consecutively, the private key s can be solved.[23]
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2.6 Secure Curve Parameters
This section summarizes some general key-points of suitable elliptic curves for cryp-
tography. The current standards and recommendations for elliptic curve cryptography
are also studied, mainly based on the criteria provided by NIST 800-186 [7]. Certicom
standards [13] are also used for reference.
The used elliptic curve E(K) should have a signicantly large subgroup of prime order,
that is, #E = n ·h where n is a large prime factor and h is a relatively small co-factor.
If the co-factor h is too large, the curve is exposed to the Pohlig-Hellman attack,
which takes advantage on small prime factors of the group order.[39] NIST suggests a
co-factor of h ≤ 210 to be used. If the prime factor n is not large enough, the curve is
vulnerable to Pollard's Rho attack for solving ECDLP in the prime subgroup of E.
Moreover, a secure elliptic curve should not be supersingular nor anomalous. Non-
supersingularity is achieved with a large embedding degree, which is explained in
the section 4.1. As mentioned, supersingular curves are vulnerable to MOV-attacks,
whereas anomalous curves are exposed to attacks regarding DLP.
The bit length of an elliptic curve E(Fq) refers to the bit size of q. NIST recommends a
minimum of 224 bits for prime curves and 233 bits for binary curves. Prime curves are
suggested to be used. The NIST prime curves are constructed over a eld with specially
chosen prime, allowing ecient reduction modulo p.[23] Commonly used curve NIST
P-256, (or secp256r1 in Certicom standards) is generated over a prime eld with
p = 2256−2224 +2192 +296−1.[7] Certicom and NIST standards seem to agree on most
of the recommendations.
Other prime curves are Montgomery and Twisted Edward curves, which are yet in
limited use but garnering academic interest. Their curve type diers from the usual
Weierstrass form. For instance, the Montgomery curve is dened as Ay2 = x3 +Bx2 +
x, A,B ∈ Fq, where A 6= ±2 and B 6= 0. Montgomery and Twisted Edward curves are
claimed to oer enhanced performance and resilience against side-channel attacks.[7]
One alternative for standardized curves is Curve25519 [9], which is a Montgomery
curve y2 = x3 + 486662x2 + x over a prime eld with p = 2255 − 19. It is constructed
to be ecient as well as to avoid many implementation pitfalls.
Communication parties deploying ECC can agree on the used curve, and simply use
the parameters in the standards. Only the random scalar value s is left as the user's
responsibility (the private key). For instance, standardized curve NIST P-224 as in
[7], is given by the parameters:
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p = 2224 − 296 + 1
= 26959946667150639794667015087019630673557916260026308143510066298881
(= 0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff000000000000000000000001)
b = 1895828628556660800040866854449392641550468096867932107578723467256
(= 0xb4050a850c04b3abf54132565044b0b7d7bfd8ba270b39432355ffb4)
E : y2 ≡ x3 − 3x+ b (mod p), with an order
#E = 26959946667150639794667015087019625940457807714424391721682722368061
(= 0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffff16a2e0b8f03e13dd29455c5c2a3d)
which is a prime, i.e. h = 1. Standards also includes the base point G = (Gx, Gy)
and the seed value for SHA-1 algorithm, whose output is used to generate the curve
parameters. Thus, the seed can be used to verify the validity of the curve parameters.[7]
In addition to the secure curve parameters, the used algorithms can fortify security.
The choice of algorithms for point arithmetic is usually a trade-o between eciency
and side-channel security. Appropriate algorithms for elliptic curve arithmetic are
discussed in chapter 5.
2.6.1 Algorithms
Scalar multiplication causes the most workload on elliptic curve computations. The
goal is to compute kP for some k ∈ N and P ∈ E. One convenient method is the
double-and-add approach for elliptic curve points. Let k = k0+k1 ·2+k2 ·22+. . .+kt ·2t,
where ki ∈ {0, 1} for i = 0, 1, . . . , t − 1 and kt = 1. The double-and-add algorithm is
dened as follows:
input : Elliptic curve E, curve point P and scalar k as binary representation
output: P ′ = kP
1 Initialize P ′ ← P
2 for i← t− 1 to 0 do
3 P ′ ← 2P ′ + kiP
4 end
5 Return P ′
Algorithm 1: Double-and-Add algorithm
The algorithm scans the bit representation of k bit by bit. Doubling is performed in
every iteration, and if ki = 1, addition of P is performed. On average, for a random
t+ 1 bit scalar, the algorithm needs 1, 5t point doubles and additions.[33]
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Although the Double-and-Add method is ecient, it is vulnerable to side-channel
attacks. As the point addition and doubling consume dierent amounts of power, the
attacker may distinguish the value of kj, using the Simple Power-Analysis attack.[30]
Another, more suitable algorithm for cryptographic applications is the Montgomery
ladder, as depicted in Algorithm 2.
input : Elliptic curve point P ∈ E and scalar k as binary representation
output: Q = kP
1 Initialize R0 ← P , R1 ← 2P
2 for i← t− 1 to 0 do
3 b← ki, R1−b ← R1−b +Rb
4 Rb ← 2Rb
5 end
6 Return R0
Algorithm 2: Montgomery ladder
Montgomery ladder has several advantages for cryptographical purposes. As it per-
forms the same curve operations in every iteration, the adversary can not inspect the
bits of k from the power traces. Thus, attacks based on power-analysis are prevented.
Besides, certain fault-injection attacks are thwarted, as dummy operations are not
needed.[30]
19
Chapter 3
Pairing Based Cryptography
The eld of pairing-based cryptography is the enabling factor for a new class of se-
curity schemes, such as identity-based cryptosystems [11], searchable encryption [26]
and certicateless signatures [34]. Originally, pairings were invented for purposes of
cryptanalysis [27], utilizing the Weil pairing. Pairings have been adopted as an indis-
pensable tool for protocol designers, and a lot of contribution is given for enhancing
their performance. Currently, one of the most ecient pairings is the optimal ate
pairing by Vercauteren [38], which is used in this work.
The fundamental idea of bilinear pairings is to construct a mapping between two con-
venient cryptographic groups, reducing a problem in one group to a dierent, usually
easier task in another group. The bilinear pairing itself is not directly associated with
elliptic curves. However, the majority of the pairings utilize subgroups or quotient
groups of elliptic curves over prime elds or prime eld extensions. In this work,
groups over pairing-friendly Barreto-Naehrig [8] curves are employed.
This chapter serves as an introduction to pairing based cryptography, containing the
generalized notion of the bilinear pairing, some security aspects, and an example of
pairing-based protocol; the Boneh-Boyen cryptosystem. Furthermore, the optimal ate
pairing and the related concepts are presented. The main sources are [30], [18] and
[38].
Note: due to frequent usage of ∞ as the neutral element in the relating literature, it
is henceforth used as the neutral element instead of O.
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3.1 Bilinear Pairings
Let G1, G2 be two groups of prime order n, under a group operation ◦, and GT a cyclic
multiplicative group of the order n. A bilinear pairing, (or simply, a pairing) is an
eciently computable mapping e : G1 × G2 → GT satisfying the following conditions
([30]):
1. Bilinearity: Mapping e is linear in both arguments: ∀P,Q ∈ G1, ∀P ′, Q′ ∈ G2 :
e(P ◦Q,P ′) = e(P, P ′)e(Q,P ′)
e(P, P ′ ◦Q′) = e(P, P ′)e(P,Q′).
2. Non-degeneracy: For any P ∈ G1 exists Q ∈ G2 for which e(P,Q) 6= 1, and for
any Q ∈ G2 exists P ∈ G1 such that e(P,Q) 6= 1.
The operation ◦ for groups G1 and G2 is usually addition of elliptic curve points,
but it can as well be a multiplicative operation. From the bilinearity it follows that
e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab, ∀a, b ∈ Z. It is possible that G1 = G2, the pairing is then
symmetric. For a symmetric pairing: e(P,Q) = e(Q,P ).[30]
As previously mentioned, majority of pairings are constructed from elliptic curves.
Considering an elliptic curve E with an order of #E = n · h. Now if n is a prime,
then G1 is the subgroup of E(Fq) of order n: G1 = {hP | P ∈ E(Fq)}. Then for a
proper choice of k, there exists a pairing e : G1 × G2 → GT , where G2 ⊂ E(Fqk) and
GT ⊂ F∗qk . It follows that #GT |(q
k − 1).[18]
The actual computation of a certain pairing depends on the type of the pairing and the
used curve type. As mentioned, the idea is to form an ecient mapping to transform
a problem in a certain group into an easier problem in another group. The ate pairing
and it's optimized variant is presented in sections 3.5 and 3.6.
3.1.1 Security of Bilinear Pairings
The following property is closely related to security but also in the eciency of the
computation of pairing:
Denition 3.1 ([18]). Embedding degree. Let P ∈ E(Fq) be a point of prime order n
such that gcd(n, q) = 1. The embedding degree of 〈P 〉 is the smallest k ∈ Z>0 such
that n | qk − 1.
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As mentioned, the curves with low embedding degree are exposed to the MOV attack.
The MOV attack utilizes Weil-pairing to transform an instance of ECDLP into a
corresponding instance of DLP over GT ⊂ F∗qk , where k is the embedding degree. Let
P, aP ∈ G1 and Q ∈ G2. Then compute g = e(P,Q) and h = e(αP,Q). Now by
linearity: h = e(P,Q)α = gα. Thus, computing the discrete logarithm of αP in G1 is
equal to nding the dicrete logarithm of gα in GT . Hence the index calculus algorithm
can be applied to attack the system.[18][27]
The intractability of Bilinear Die-Hellman problem is the underlying concept for
secure pairing-based protocols. It is formulated as follows.
Denition 3.2 ([18]). Bilinear Die-Hellman problem. Let e : G1 × G2 → GT be a
bilinear pairing. The bilinear Die-Hellman problem (BDHP) is dened as: Given
P, aP, bP ∈ G1 and Q ∈ G2, compute e(P,Q)ab.
Hardness of BDHP implies hardness of DHP in both G1 and GT . That is, computing
of abP is dicult for known aP and bP . Moreover in GT , nding g
a = e(aP,Q),
gb = e(bP,Q) and then computing gab.[18]
To choose an appropriate curve for pairing operations, the parameters q, n and k
of the relation n|qk − 1 should meet certain conditions. Prime divisor n of #E(Fq)
should be suciently large to preclude the attack with Pollard's rho. The embedding
degree k should be large enough to thwart the MOV-attack. Cryptographically weak
supersingular curves have embedding degree k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 6}. On the other hand,
k should be small enough so that pairing with Fqk can be computed eciently. In
addition, low Hamming weight of n speeds up the doubling operations.[18][30]
Curves satisfying these properties are called pairing friendly. The vast majority of
elliptic curves have an extremely large embedding degree, rendering the pairing com-
putation infeasible, as well as the MOV attack.[18] Pairing friendly curves are relatively
rare, as k ≈ n for a majority of curves as shown in the work of Balasubramanian et
al. [5] for prime-order elliptic curves over prime elds.
3.2 Barreto-Naehrig Curves
Barreto and Naehrig [8] composed a method for generating pairing-friendly elliptic
curves with prime order and embedding degree k = 12. The equation of the Barreto-
Naehrig (BN) curve is E : y2 = x3 + b, b 6= 0. BN-curves utilize a certain parametri-
sation of the trace of Frobenius of the curve, the curve order #E and the group order
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#Fq, as follows:
t(u) = 6u2 + 1
p(u) = 36u4 + 36u3 + 24u2 + 6u+ 1
n(u) = 36u4 + 36u3 + 18u2 + 6u+ 1.
Due to parameterization, the memory needed for information of a BN curve is
small: only the parameter u suces. Parameter u must be chosen such that both
n = n(u) and p = p(u) are prime. Parametrisation also enables more ecient
computations.[8][30]
Another benet from BN-curves is that they possess an eciently computable group
homomorphism, which allows computing points of E(Fp12) as points in E ′(Fp2). The
group E ′(Fp2) : y′2 = x′3 + b/ξ is the sextic twist of E(Fp12), where ζ is an element for
which x6− ζ is irreducible over Fp2 [x]. It is used to construct the Fp12 over the second-
degree eld Fp2 . The injective group homomorphism is dened as ψ : E ′(Fp2) →
E(Fp12), (x′, y′) 7→ (x′z2, y′z3). The mapping produces a point whose x-coordinate is
in Fp6 , and y-coordinate in Fp4 .[8]
Sextic twist, or generally, a degree-d twist is a certain transformation of an elliptic
curve. The process is also known as point-compressing. It allows pairing values to be
compressed to one-third or even one-sixth of their original length.[8]
3.3 Boneh-Boyen Identity Based Encryption
In the usual public key infrastructure, generating and distributing the public keys
require an agreement between communication parties. This furthermore leads to a
need of certicates to verify the ownership of a certain public key.
In the Identity Based Encryption (IBE) the public key is constituted by a certain
predetermined string. The corresponding private key is generated by (and only by)
the Private Key Generator (PKG), which knows the certain master secret. Each user
of the system has some value bound to his identity, for example, an e-mail address,
from which the public key is derived. The user authenticates himself to PKG, which
assigns him the private key, corresponding to his identity.[11]
The rst applicable version of identity-based cryptosystem was brought up by Boneh
and Franklin [12] with their solution using the Weil-pairing. Another, more secure1
version is the Boneh-Boyen IBE algorithm [11], which is represented next.
1Boneh-Boyen does not require the random-oracle assumption, whereas the former Boneh-Franklin
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Boneh-Boyen IBE utilizes collision-resistant hash-functions and its security is based
on Decisional BDH assumption. Boneh-Boyen IBE makes use of a symmetric pairing
G1 ×G1 → GT , where G1 and GT are multiplicative groups. Let
∑
= {0, . . . , s} be
an alphabet with size of s, and {Hk : {0, 1}w →
∑n}k∈K with w > 0 be a family of
hash functions. The identication (ID) is assumed to be a w-length bit string {0, 1}w.
The algorithm has four dierent operations: setup, key generation, encryption, and
decryption.
Setup. First, a random generator g ∈ G∗1 and α ∈ Zp are chosen and g1 = gα is set.
Next, a random g2 ∈ G1 is chosen and a random n × s matrix U = (ui,j) ∈ Gn×s is
constructed, where each ui,j is uniform in G. Moreover, a random k ∈ K is picked as
the key for the hash function. Now the system parameters are (g, g1, g2, U, k), and the
master-key is gα2 .
Key generation. Denote a = Hk(ID) = (a1 . . . an) ∈
∑n (n-length vector of al-
phabets) and pick random r1, . . . , rn ∈ Zp. The private key corresponding an identity
ID ∈ {0, 1}w is generated as
dID =
(
gα2 ·
n∏
i=1
urii,ai , g
r1 , . . . , grn
)
∈ Gn+1.
Encryption. Let M ∈ G1 be a message and a, and Hk(ID) as above and let t be a
random element in Zp. Now the encryption of M under the given parameters and the
public ID is as follows:
C =
(
M · e(g1, g2)t, gt, , ut1,a1 , . . . , u
t
n,an
)
∈ GT ×Gn+11 .
The cryptotext C is thus (n + 2)-tuple of elements in GT and G1. For simplication,
we denote A = M · e(g1, g2)t and utj,aj = Cj.
Decryption. The owner of the private key dID = (d0, d1, . . . , dn) can decrypt the
message C = (A, gt, C1, . . . , Cn) as
A ·
∏n
j=1 e(Cj, dj)
e(gt, d0)
= M.
Let's go through the calculations more in detail to justify the process.
The goal is to solve the M from M · e(g1, g2)t using the information of the private key
dID and elements g
t and Cj of the vector C. Now recalling the bilinearity of a pairing,
version does.
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i.e. e(P,Q ·R) = e(P,Q) · e(P,R) and the notations for Cj and dj above:
A ·
∏n
j=1 e(Cj, dj)
e(gt, d0)
=A ·
∏n
j=1 e(u
t
j,aj
, grj)
e(gt, gα2 ·
∏n
j=1 u
rj
j,aj
)
= A ·
∏n
j=1 e(uj,aj , g)
trj
e(gt, gα2 )e(g
t,
∏n
j=1 u
rj
j,aj
)
=A ·
∏n
j=1 e(uj,aj , g)
trj
e(g, g2)αte(gt,
∏n
j=1 u
rj
j,aj
)
?
= A ·
∏n
j=1 e(uj,aj , g)
trj
e(gα, g2)t
∏n
j=1 e(g, uj,aj)
trj
=M · e(g1, g2)t
1
e(g1, g2)t
= M.
The equality at (?) follows from applying the bilinearity property consecutively on the
pairing in the denominator. Also, the property e(Pα, Qβ) = e(P,Q)αβ = e(P β, Qα),
and the commutativity of symmetric pairing was used, i.e. e(P,Q) = e(Q,P ).
For proofs of security and further details, one may refer to [11].
3.4 Divisors and Rational Functions
The notion of a divisor of an elliptic curve and rational functions on elliptic curves are
closely related on evaluation of a pairing. All known pairings include an evaluation
of a certain rational function, with a certain divisor.[18] Divisors contain information
about the function of interest, namely of the special points; poles and zeros. A function
is said to have a pole at P if it gets the value ∞ at that point, and a zero if it gets
the value 0.
Denition 3.3 ([18]). Divisor. A divisor on an elliptic curve E(K) is a formal sum
D =
∑
P∈E aPP of points P on the curve such that
1. The sum is nite,
2. The coecient aP is an integer for each point P ,
3. Two sums equal only if the all the coecients equal. That is, the sum is unique.
The degree D of a divisor is dened as deg(D) =
∑
P∈E aP . The empty divisor is
denoted as ∅, and it's degree is 0.[18]
Denition 3.4 ([18]). Rational function over E. Let E be an elliptic curve (eq. 2.1)
over a eld K. A rational function on E is a function f : E → K of the form
f(x, y) =
f1(x, y)
f2(x, y)
where f1 and f2 are polynomials in the variables x and y.
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Denition 3.5 ([18]). Let f(x, y) 6= 0 be rational function over E as dened above.
The order of f for any point P ∈ E, denoted as ordP (f) is dened as follows:
1. If f(P ) 6= 0 and 1
f(P )
6= 0, then ordP (f) = 0.
2. If f(P ) = 0, then ordP (f) is the multiplicity of the root at P of the numerator
f1(x, y).
3. If 1
f(P )
= 0, then ordP (f) equals the negative of the multiplicity of the root at P
of the denominator f2(x, y).
Summarizing, the function f has non-zero order on a point P , only if the point is pole
or zero of the function.
Denition 3.6 ([18]). Principal divisor. Let f 6= 0 be a rational function on an elliptic
curve E. The principal divisor div(f), generated by f is denoted as
div(f) =
∑
P∈E
ordP (f) · (P ).
Principal divisor expresses the nite sum of all the points P ∈ E on which either f1
or f2 equal to zero. In other words, it is a linear combination of poles and zeros of the
function f on elliptic curve E.
Furthermore, a divisorD on E is called a principal divisor if div(f) = D for some ratio-
nal function f on E. Also, the mapping div(f) is a homomorphism from multiplicative
to additive group: div(fg) = div(f) + div(g) and div(1) = ∅.[18]
Theorem 3.1 ([18]). For any rational function f on elliptic curve E: deg(div(f)) = 0.
Example 5. Let E : y2 = x3 − x be an elliptic curve, and let f(x, y) = x
y
on E. The
principal divisor div(f) can be computed as follows. First considering f1(x, y) = x,
which equals zero when P = (0, 0). Multiplicity of the root is 2, so ord(0,0)(f1) = 2.
Moreover, 1/f1 = 0 when P =∞, and by thm. (3.1): ord∞(f1) = −2.
Similarly for the function f2(x, y) = y. As y
2 = x3 − x = x(x − 1)(x + 1), f2 equals
zero on P = (0,±1) and P = (0, 0). For 1/f2 = 0, P = ∞, with order of −3 (thm
(3.1)).
Now by utilizing div(f/g) = div(f)− div(g), the principal divisor is
div(f) =
∑
P∈E
ordP (f) · (P ) =
∑
P∈E
ordP (x) · (P )−
∑
P∈E
ordP (y) · (P )
= {2((0, 0))− 2(∞)} − {((0, 0)) + ((1, 0)) + ((−1, 0))− 3(∞)}
= ((0, 0))− ((1, 0))− ((−1, 0)) + (∞)
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Thus, the function has zeros at (0, 0) and∞, and poles at (1, 0) and (−1, 0). Note that
the function x
y
as itself is not dened at the point (x, y) = (0, 0). But on the elliptic
curve E: y2 = x3 − x ⇐⇒ x
y
=
y
x2 − 1
, which is dened at the point (0, 0).
3.5 The Ate Pairing
As dened in [38], the ate pairing is a non-degenerated bilinear asymmetric pairing
G1 ×G2 → GT , dened over the groups
G1 = E(Fp)[n] ∩Ker(πp − [1]),
G2 = E(Fpk)[n] ∩Ker(πp − [p]),
GT = F∗pk/(F
∗
pk)
n,
where E(Fpk)[n] denotes the n torsion group of E(Fpk), πp is the Frobenius endomor-
phism E → E : (x, y) 7→ (xp, yp) and [n] denotes the scalar multiplication of a curve
point.[38] The group can be interpret as follows: G1 is r-torsion points of E(Fp), for
which πp(P ) − [1]P = 0, i.e. πp(P ) = P . This applies for points with coordinates in
non-extension eld Fp. The group GT is a quotient group, where (F∗pk)
n is the elements
of F∗
pk
raised to the nth power.
The ate pairing for P ∈ G1 and Q ∈ G2 (the arguments are swapped) is dened as:
e(Q,P ) = fλ,Q(P )
(pk−1)/n. (3.1)
For derivation of the pairing and proofs for bilinearity and redundancy, see [38]. The
computation of ate pairing consists of two phases: evaluation of a certain Miller func-
tion fλ,P (·), and a nal exponentiation process.
3.5.1 Miller's Algorithm
The Miller function fr,P (·) is a rational function with r zeros at P , a pole at [r]P and
r − 1 poles at ∞:
div(fr,P ) = r(P )− ([r]P )− (r − 1)∞. (3.2)
The idea of Miller's function is to map two elliptic curve points into a single point in
nite eld. In general, the function can not be evaluated directly, but the following
observation enables ecient computation of it.
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Lemma 3.2 ([28]). Let P ∈ E[n] and i, j ∈ N \ {0}. Let lA,B be a line through points
A = (xA, yA) and B = (xB, yB), and v be a vertical line through a point A+B, where
A = [i]P and B = [j]P . Then
fi+j,P = fi,Pfj,P
l[i]P,[j]P
v[i+j]P
. (3.3)
Proof. Using the fact of eq. (3.2) and that the divisor is a homomorphism:
div(fi,Pfj,P
l
v
) = div(fi,P ) + div(fj,P ) + div(l)− div(v)
= {i(P )− ([i]P )− (i− 1)(∞)}+ {j(P )− ([j]P )− (j − 1)(∞)}
+ {([i]P ) + ([j]P ) + (−[i+ j]P )− 3(∞))}
− {([i+ j]P ) + (−[i+ j]P )− (i+ j − 1)(∞)}
= (i+ j)(P )− ([i+ j]P )− (i+ j − 1)(∞)
= div(fi+j)
As a consequence, the function fr,P (·) can be constructed eciently with Miller's
algorithm, as depicted in Algorithm 3, from [38]. The algorithm computes the function
with O(log n) steps, utilizing the double-and-add approach.[28] For further details and
more rigorous reasoning of the presented information, one can refer to the original
article by Miller [28].
input : P,Q ∈ E[n], P 6= Q and r ∈ N.
output: fr,P (Q).
1 Let r =
∑L
i=0 ri2
i, with ri ∈ {0, 1} and rL = 1.
2 T ← P , f ← 1
3 for i← L− 1 to 0 do
4 f ← f 2 · lT,T (Q)
v[2]T (Q)
5 T ← [2]T
6 if ri = 1 then
7 f ← f · lT,P (Q)
vT⊕P (Q)
8 T ← T ⊕ P
9 end
10 end
11 return f
Algorithm 3: Miller's algorithm for computing fr,P (Q)
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One common optimization in Miller function computation is the denominator elimi-
nation. With certain conditions, the element vT⊕P (Q) is in Fqd ⊂ Fqk . As the order of
the subeld divides the order of the eld Fqk , the denominator is eliminated in nal
exponentiation. Therefore, computation of it can be ignored. Namely if x ∈ Fqd , then
x(q
k−1)/n = 1. This applies especially when embedding degree k is even.[30]
3.5.2 Final Exponentiation
The nal exponentiation process ensures the unique result of the pairing. The output
of the Miller loop is raised to the power of (pk−1)/n to obtain an unique representative
of an element in the coset F∗
pk
/(F∗
pk
)n. Let k = 2d, then:
pk − 1
n
= (pd − 1) · p
d + 1
Φk(p)
· Φk(p)
n
,
where Φk(p) is a certain k:th cyclotomic polynomial. The rst two coecients of
the exponentiation are called the easy part of the nal exponentiation, whereas the
coecient Φk(p)/n forms the hard part.[30]
In the context of BN curves, the exponential (p12 − 1)/n is factorized into (p6 − 1),
(p2 + 1) and (p4 − p2 + 1)/n. The rst two terms form the easy part, which is easily
computed owing to cheap Frobenius mapping. The hard part, i.e. the exponentiation
by (p4 − p2 + 1)/n needs extra treatment, as the fraction will be decomposed into a
large polynomial by expanding the parametrizations.
The process of calculating depends of the used curve and elds. In this work, the
modied variant of nal exponentiation by Fuentes-Castaneda [20] for BN curves are
used, in addition to squaring in cyclotomic subgroups [21]. The nal exponentiation
process is inspected more in detail in the section 4.4.
3.6 Optimal Ate pairing over Barreto-Naehrig
Curves
Vercauteren [38] presented an idea of constructing optimal pairings, with a reduced
Miller loop length (1/ϕ(k)) log2 n, where k is the embedding degree. The idea of
optimal ate pairing (or O-ate) is on nding base-q expansion for λ =
∑l
i=0 ciq
i, divisible
29
by n. The optimal bilinear pairing is then given as
(P,Q) 7→
(
l∏
i=0
f q
i
ci,Q
(P ) ·
l−1∏
i=0
l[si+1]Q,[ciqi]Q(P )
v[si]Q(P )
)(qk−1)/n
(3.4)
where si =
∑l
j=i cjq
j. It is required that mkqk−1 6= ((qk−1)/n) ·
∑l
i=0 iciq
i−1 (mod n)
for the pairing to be non-degenerate.
Vercauteren showed that by choosing a polynomial λ with small coecients ci, the
Miller loop has at most (1/ϕ(k)) log2 n iterations. Barreto-Naehrig curves can be
utilized in this purpose.
Recalling the curve order and the group order for BN curves: p(u) = 36u4 + 36u3 +
24u2 + 6u+ 1 and n(u) = 36u4 + 36u3 + 18u2 + 6u+ 1. By direct computation it can
be observed that
(6u+ 2) + p(u)− p(u)2 + p(u)3 ≡ 0 (mod n(u)).
This represents the q = p(u) based expansion for λ, as it also divides the n(u) = #Fpk .
As the BN curves are used, the denominator from l[si+1]Q,[ciqi]Q(P )/v[si]Q(P ) can be
eliminated. Now by applying λ in 3.4, an optimal ate pairing over BN curve is obtained:
(Q,P ) 7→(f6x+2,Q(P )f p1,Q(P )f
p2
−1,Q(P )f
p3
1,Q(P )
· l[p−p2+p3]Q,[6x+2]Q(P )l[−p2+p3]Q,[p]Q(P )l[p3]Q,[−p2]Q(P ))(p
k−1)/r
=
(
f6x+2,Q(P ) · l[p−p2+p3]Q,[6x+2]Q(P )l[−p2+p3]Q,[p]Q(P )l[p3]Q,[−p2]Q(P )
)(pk−1)/r
The equality follows from f1,Q(P ) = f−1,Q(P ) = 1. Now with a further ne-tuning, as
in [31], the nal version of optimal ate pairing is
aopt = (f6x+2,Q(P ) · l[6x+2]Q,πp(Q)(P ) · l[6x+2]Q+πp(Q),−π2p(Q)(P ))
(p12−1)/r (3.5)
where πp(Q) is the Frobenius endomorphism.
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Chapter 4
High Level Arithmetic
As mentioned, the pairing implementation contains many sub-processes that can be
optimized further to obtain a more enhanced version of the pairing. As demonstrated
in Figure 4.1, the arithmetic of bilinear pairings occurs in several layers. Miller's
loop phase constructs the rational Miller function using arithmetic of elliptic curve
points. The curve operations, as well as the nal-exponentiation process, ultimately
break down into operations in large extension elds. These consecutively reduce into
prime-eld arithmetic, and eventually into machine instructions with large integers.
The used pairing implementation by Unterluggauer et al. [37] follows the state-of-art
design of [10] and [16]. The ecient formulas by Costello et al. [15] are used for curve
point arithmetic in the Miller loop. For nal exponentiation, a modied variant by
Fuentes-Castaneda et al. [20], and ecient squaring formulas in cyclotomic subgroups
[21] are used. Also, in the O-ate pairing function itself, an inversion trick by Aranha
et al. [1] is utilized.
This chapter presents the key methodology employed within the O-ate pairing over the
BN curves, keeping the scope on the methods relevant for this work. In section 4.1, the
arithmetic on the nite elds, the construction of extension elds, and some optimizing
tricks are outlined. The second section presents the used curve point arithmetic.
Section 4.3 explains the computations used in the nal exponentiation, containing less
memory consuming optimization.
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Figure 4.1: Operation ow of the pairing process
4.1 Field Arithmetic
Careful implementation of eld and integer arithmetic has a crucial role in achieving
ecient pairing implementations. The operations with eld extensions such as Fp12
and Fp2 are reduced into operations on the prime eld Fp. These, in turn are processed
as a set of word-size multi-precision integer values and computed as CPU instructions.
In this section, we outline the basic ideas of eld arithmetic and present the essential
methods used in this work. The implementation aspects in hardware level are also
considered. The eld multiplication is emphasized, as it will be optimized in this work
at the instruction level. The eld arithmetic is mainly based on the techniques used
by Beuchat et al. [10] , Devegili et al. [16] and Aranha et al. [1]. Another supportive
literature used is [30].
4.1.1 Extensions Fields
To perform extension eld arithmetic eciently, the high degree eld extensions are
constructed as a tower of lower degree sub-elds. The main idea is expressing the
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prime eld extension Fpk = Fp[z]/f(z) as Fpm , where m|k such that
Fpk = Fpm [v]/g(v), where g(v) ∈ Fpm [v] , deg(g) = k/m
Fpm = Fp[u]/h(u), where h(u) ∈ Fp , deg(h) = m,
also recalling that g(v) and h(u) must be irreducible polynomials. Low-degree poly-
nomials of low hamming weight are commonly used as the irreducible polynomials, as
they provide ecient multiplications and reductions.[30]
The used BN-curve parameter in this work is u = −262 − 255 − 1, which applied to
the parametrization, yields p(u) ≡ 3 (mod 4). Therefore x2 − β, where β = −1 can
be used as the irreducible polynomial for Fp2 . This results in faster arithmetic, as the
multiplication by β corresponds to a simple subtraction.[1]
In order to utilize the sextic twist of BN curves, the eld Fp12 must be built as an
extension of Fp2 for certain operations. The following tower extensions are used in this
work:
Fp2 = Fp[u]/(u2 + 1)
Fp4 = Fp2 [s]/(s2 − ζ), where ζ = 1 + i
Fp12 = Fp2 [v]/(v6 − ζ) or Fp12 = Fp4 [v]/(v3 − s)
The towering Fp → Fp2 → Fp4 → Fp12 is mostly adopted for arithmetic in this work,
but another variant can be applied by permuting the order of coecients.[1][37]
In the hardware level, a eld element x ∈ Fp is presented according to the size of p
and the word length W of the processor in bits. In this work p is a size of 256 bits
and W = 32. An arbitrary x ∈ Fp is presented in the memory as x7232·7 + x6232·6 +
x52
32·5 + x42
32·4 + x32
32·3 + x22
32·2 + x12
32 + x0, or (x7, x6, x5, x4, x3, x2, x1, x0), where
xi is a size of under 32 bits. An element x of an extension eld Fpk would consist of
k aforementioned 8-word arrays of prime eld elements. For more details, one might
refer to [30].
4.1.2 Prime Field Multiplication
An ecient prime eld multiplication is a standard building block of the pairing func-
tion. The general method for multiplying a, b ∈ Fp consists of computing t = a · b and
then applying reduction, i.e. computing t (mod p). In this work, ecient Karatsuba
multiplier paired with Montgomery multiplication is used.
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The Karatsuba multiplier exploits a certain base presentation and "divide and con-
quer" approach, allowing the number of required word-multiplications to be reduced.
Let a = (a1, a0) and b = (b1, b0) be two integers with a bit size of 2W . The Karatsuba
product can be written as:
a · b = (a12W + a0) · (b12W + b0)
= a1b12
2W + (a1b0 + a0b1)2
W + a0b0 (4.1)
= a1b12
2W + ((a0 + a1)(b0 + b1)− a0b0 − a1b1)2W + a0b0
As can be observed, the last expression requires only three word multiplications: a0b0,
a1b1, (a0 +a1)(b0 +b1), which is less than in the basic "schoolbook" multiplication. For
n-word multiplications, the complexity of Karatsuba is O(nlog2 3), whereas the "School-
book" method requires O(n2) steps. Karatsuba can be eectively used recursively for
larger inputs.[30]
To scale the result to Fp, a reduction is needed. This could be achieved with a costly
division by p and taking the remainder. Fortunately, more ecient methods exist.
The Montgomery multiplication takes advantage of a certain mapping, which allows
trading the division by p with a division by R = 2k. TheMontgomery representation is
the mapping ã = a ·R (mod p), which maps the element a into a Montgomery domain.
The Montgomery product for c = a · b (mod p) is dened as c̃ = ã · b̃ · r−1 (mod p).
The result is easily mapped back to the integer domain as c = c̃ · r−1 (mod p). The
products can be computed with e.g. Karatsuba multiplier.[30]
The algorithm 4 demonstrates the classical variant of Montgomery multiplication,
which additionally requires a parameter p′ such that R ·R−1 − p · p′ = 1, i.e p′p ≡ −1
(mod p). First (step 1), the elements are mapped into the Montgomery domain. Then,
a certain parameter q is computed (step 2), followed by the reduction (step 3). The
value is then scaled, and returned.[30] The variable q = t · p′ (mod R) ensures that
t + q · p is a multiple of R, as t + q · p ≡ t + tp′ · p ≡ t − t ≡ 0 (mod R). Now, as
u · R ≡ t + q · p ≡ t (mod p), it follows that u = t · R−1 ≡ ã · b̃ · R−1 (mod p) as
required. After nishing, the value u must be mapped back to the integer domain.[30]
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input : n-word prime p, R = 2n·W , parameters ã, b̃, p′
output: u = MontPr(ã, b̃) = ã · b̃ ·R−1 (mod p).
1 t← ã · b̃
2 q ← t · p′ (mod R)
3 u← (t+ q · p)/R
4 if u > p then
5 return u− p
6 else
7 return u
8 end
9 return u
Algorithm 4: Montgomery multiplication
The division by 2k is a cheap operation, as it corresponds to a k-bit shift in the
CPU level. The variable k ∈ Z such that 2k−1 < |p| < 2k is required to be precom-
puted, as well as the parameter p′. The Montgomery multiplication has little bit of
overhead due to conversion between Montgomery and integer domain, and from the
computation of q. However, it is not signicant as the required multiplications and
additions can be performed sequentially without the need to move back to the integer
domain. The reduction is especially useful in exponentiation with the square-and-
multiply approach.[30]
4.1.3 Prime-Field Inversion
This work utilizes an optimized prime-eld inversion. The parametrization of the
BN-curve enables the usage of an exponent-based inversion instead of the common
Euclidean algorithm. The algorithm makes use of Fermat's little theorem, and the
parametrization of p. Applying these, the inverse of a−1 ∈ Fp can be expressed as
a−1 (mod p) = ap(u)−2 (mod p) = a36u
4+36u3+24u2+6u−1 (mod p)
= a6u−1 · a24u2 · a36u3 · a36u4 (mod p)
As the exponents are public information, the side-channel protected, and thus more
costly exponential algorithms are not needed. The exponentiation is carried out ef-
ciently by a certain chain of computations. A clear benet is gained from the low
hamming weight of the parameter u. Additionally, the parameter 6u − 1 can be
precomputed.[37]
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4.1.4 Extension Field Arithmetic
As mentioned, the computations of high-degree elds are reduced into lower degree
arithmetic, ultimately into big-integer operations. The main optimization from this
standpoint is to optimize the high-degree arithmetic to consume the minimum amount
of such primitive operations. It is best achieved with the combination of the curve
parameters the pairing function is constructed with, and the ecient eld arithmetic.
As already noted, the parameter u = −262 − 255 − 1 = −40800000 00000001h, in
addition to the sextic twist of the BN-curve family provide optimizations. The low-
hamming weight parameter provides ecient computations involving p(u), and e-
cient tower construction. The sextic-twist, in turn, provides savings due to point-
compression, recalling from section 3.2. This allows to use "sparse" multiplication as
the point in E(Fp12) can be presented as smaller elements; in this work as elements of
Fp2 and Fp4 .
The extension eld arithmetic follows the design philosophy of Beuchat et al. [10] and
Devegili et al. [16]. The multiplication in Fp2 utilizes a lazy reduction as in [1] for multi-
plying. It computes the arithmetic at the big-integer level, and performs the reductions
directly in the Fp2 . Computationally it corresponds to 3 integer multiplications, 5 ad-
ditions, and 2 reductions, which is less than in a plain Karatsuba implementation. The
inversion in Fp2 is computed as (a+bu)−1 = (a−bu)·(a2−βb2)−1 = (a−bu)·(a2+b2)−1.
In Fp12 , the Chung-Hasan complex squaring is utilized. Karatsuba multiplier is exten-
sively used in all elds, except for the sparse multiplication in Fp12 . In the nal
exponentiation process the fast squaring in cyclotomic subgroups is used. This will be
briey discussed in section 4.4.1.
Table 4.1 summarizes the costs of the basic operations over elds used in this work, in
addition to the cyclotomic subgroup GΦ6 < Fp12 . The sets (a,m, s, i) and (â, m̂, ŝ, î)
correspond to addition, multiplication, squaring and inversion in the elds Fp and Fp2
respectively. Notable is that m̂ζ corresponds to only 1 negations and 2 additions, i.e.
3 additions computationally.
36
Table 4.1: Computational costs of the eld extension arithmetic
Field Add./Sub. Multiplication Squaring Inversion
Fp2 â = 2a m̂ ŝ = 2m+ 3a
î =
2m+ 2s+ 3a+ i
Fp4 2â 3m̂+ m̂ζ + 5â 2m̂+ 2m̂ζ + 5â
2m̂+ 2ŝ+ m̂ζ +
2â+ î
Fp12 6â 18m̂+8m̂ζ +60â 11m̂+11m̂ζ+45â
35m̂+ 2ŝ+
22m̂ζ + 70â+ î
GΦ6(Fp2) 6â 18m̂+8m̂ζ +60â 6m̂+ 7m̂ζ + 42â Conjugation
4.1.5 Frobenius Operator
In this section, the concept of Frobenius operator is briey outlined. Frobenius operator
is the Frobenius mapping with prime-eld characteristic p; π(x) = xp in an extension
eld Fpd . It is especially used in the nal exponentiation phase.
Considering the eld Fp2 = Fp[u]/(u2 + 1). As u2 + 1 = 0, it follows that u = i =√
−1. Thus, an element x ∈ Fp2 can be presented as x = a + ib. Now observing the
exponential:
xp = (a+ ib)p = ap + ipbp = a+ ipb
= a+ i3b (As p ≡ 3 (mod 4))
= a− ib = x̄.
Hence, the Frobenius mapping in the given extension eld corresponds to one conju-
gation, which is computationally equivalent to a prime eld addition. Furthermore, it
is easy to verify that xp
2n
= x and xp
2n−1
= x̄ for every positive integer n and x ∈ Fp2 .
Now using the extension f ∈ Fp12 = Fp2 [v]/(v6 − ζ), also noting that p ≡ 1 (mod 6),
one can write (vp)j = (v6·(p−1)/6)jvj = ζj·(p−1)/6vj = ζjv
i. Thus f p can be computed as
f p =(a0 + a1v + a2v
2 + a3v
3 + a4v
4 + a5v
5)p
ā0 + ā1v
p + ā2v
2p + ā3v
3p + ā4v
4p + ā5v
5p
ā0 + ā1ζ1v + ā2ζ2v
2 + ā3ζ3v
3 + ā4ζ4v
4 + ā5ζ5v
5.
The expression above costs 6 prime-eld additions and 5 multiplications in Fp2 . A
similar approach works for powers such as f p
2
and f p
3
, which are required in the hard
part of the nal exponentiation.[10]
37
4.2 Curve Arithmetic
The Miller's algorithm consists of curve point doubling and additions, line evaluations,
and squaring and multiplications in the extension eld Fp12 . The algorithm 5 below
describes the Miller's algorithm in this work. The curve arithmetic in the Miller loop is
computed with ecient formulas by Costello et al. [15]. The formulas take advantage
of the curve twist of the BN curve and projective coordinates.
In order to speed up computations, the line functions are computed simultaneously
with the curve point doubling and addition.
The homogeneous projective coordinates (X, Y, Z), Z 6= 0 represent the ane point
(X/Z, Y/Z) with x 7→ X/Z and y 7→ Y/Z. Similarly, the ane point (x, y) accepts the
homogeneous coordinates (X, Y, 1). The use of the homogeneous coordinates removes
the need for costly division, i.e. inversions in nite elds on calculating the slope λ, thus
resulting in faster elliptic curve point addition and doubling. For further justication,
see [15].
Using the homogeneous coordinates, the curve equation y2 = x3 + b becomes
Y 2Z = X3 + bZ3. For computing the point doubling, line addition and point ad-
dition, the ecient formulas by Costello et al. [15] are used. The formulas uti-
lize projective coordinates and take advantage of the sextic twist of BN-curves. Let
P = (X1, Y1, Z1) ∈ E ′(Fp2). Then 2P = (X3, Y3, Z3) is given as:
X3 = 2X1Y1(Y
2
1 − 9bZ21)
Y3 = Y
4
1 + 18bY
2
1 Z
2
1 − 27b2Z41
Z3 = 8Y
3
1 Z1
The corresponding line function, evaluated at S = (xs, ys) is as follows:
l2P (S) = 3X
2
1 · xs − 2Y1Z1 · yS + 3bZ21 − Y 21
The point (X3, Y3, Z3) and the line function, hereafter denoted as l2P (S) = L1 · xs −
L2 · ys + L3, are computed with the following steps:
A = X21 , B = Y
2
1 , C = Z
2
1 , D = 3bC, E = (X1 + Y1)
2 − A− B,
F = (Y1 + Z1)
2 − B − C, G = 3D, X3 = E(B −G), Y3 = (B +G)2 − 12D2,
Z3 = 4BF, L1 = 3A, L2 = −F, L3 = D − B.
Addition is performed with mixed use of ane and projective coordinates to obtain
the best eciency. Let P = (X1, Y1, Z1) ∈ E ′(Fp2) and Q = (X, Y, 1), i.e. the ane
38
representation can be used. The mixed addition and the line are computed as follows:
lP+Q(S) = (Y1 − Y2Z1)X2 − (Y1 − Y2Z1) · xs + (X1 −X2Z1) · ys − (X1 −X2Z1)Y2
For more details, see [15].
input : P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2, r = |6u+ 2| =
∑log2 (r)
i=0 ri2
i
output: f|r|,Q(P ) · l[−|r|]Q,πp(Q)(P ) · l−|r|Q+πp(Q),−π2p(Q)(P )
1 T ← Q, f ← 1
2 for i = blog2 (r)c − 1 to 0 do
3 f ← f 2 · lT,T (P ), T ← 2T
4 if ri = 1 then
5 f ← f · lT,Q(P ), T ← T +Q
6 end
7 end
8 Q1 ← πp(Q), Q2 ← π2p(Q)
9 if u < 0 then
10 T ← −T , f ← f−1
11 end
12 f ← f · lT,Q1(P ), T ← T +Q1
13 f ← f · lT,−Q2(P ), T ← T −Q2
14 return f
Algorithm 5: Miller's (revised) algorithm used in this work.
4.3 Inversion Trick
The Miller function for optimal-ate pairing is dened as aopt = fr,Q(P ) · l[r]Q,πp(Q)(P ) ·
l[r]Q+πp(Q),−π2p(Q)(P ), where πp(Q) is the Frobenius endomorphism and r = |6u+ 2|. As
the parameter u is negative, resulting into r < 0, a special treatment is required. A
cheap negation inG2 is required to compensate the terms with [−|r|]Q. As f−|r|,Q(P ) =
(f|r|,Q(P ))
−1, an expensive inversion in GT = F∗pk/(F
∗
pk
)r is also needed.[1]
The inversion trick by Aranha et al. [1] allows to replace the expensive inversion with
a simple conjugation. Let aopt(Q,P ) = [g
−1 · h](p12−1)/12, where g = f|r|,Q(P ) and
h = l[−|r|]Q,πp(Q)(P ) · l−|r|Q+πp(Q),−π2p(Q)(P ). Factorizing the power, we obtain
(g−1 · h)
p12−1
n = g
1−p12
n · h
p12−1
n = g
(1+p6)(1−p6)
n · h
p12−1
n = g
(1+p6)(p12−p6)
n · h
p12−1
n
= gp
6
g
(1+p6)(p6−1)
n · h
p12−1
n = gp
6(p12−1)/n · h
p12−1
n
= (gp
6 · h)
p12−1
n .
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The expensive inversion is thereby replaced with an exponentiation by p6, which is
equivalent to one conjugation in the corresponding group (details to follow). The
conjugation costs 3 negations in Fp2 .
4.4 Final Exponentiation
Recalling from section 3.5.2, the nal exponentiation process provides the unique result
of the pairing. In case of embedding degree k = 12, the goal is to compute f (p
12−1)/n,
where f ∈ F∗p12/(F∗p12)n is the output of the Miller's loop. The exponential can be
factored as (p12−1)/r = (p6−1) · (p2 + 1) · (p4−p2 + 1)/r, dividing it into two distinct
computation processes.
The computation of f (p
6−1)(p2+1) is the easy part of the nal exponentiation. The ex-
pression corresponds to (f̄ ·f−1)p2+1, which costs a cheap conjugation, a eld inversion,
two multiplications, and one Frobenius mapping in the eld Fp12 .[10]
For the hard part, i.e. f (p
4−p2+1)/n, a slightly optimized version of the Fuentes-
Castaneda exponentiation [20] is used. Again, recalling the parametrization for BN
curves: p(u) = 36u4 + 36u3 + 24u2 + 6u+ 1 and n(u) = 36u4 + 36u3 + 18u2 + 6u+ 1.
The hard exponent can now be rewritten as a polynomial in respect to the parameter
u as follows:
p(u)4 − p(u)2 + 1
n(u)
=− 36u3 − 30u2 − 18u− 2
+ p(u)(−36u3 − 18u2 − 12u+ 1)
+ p(u)2(6u2 + 1)
+ p(u)3.
To proceed, the following chain of operations is rst calculated:
fu → f 2u → f 4u → f 6u → f 6u2 → f 12u2 → f 12u3
Then, let a = f 6u · f 6u2 · f 12u3 and b = a · (f 2u · f)−1. The nal result of the pairing is
obtained as
f = [f 6u
2 · f · f p · a][b]p[a]p2 [b]p3 .
The proposed method requires altogether 3 exponentiations by u, 3 squarings and 11
multiplications of Fp12 , which is one multiplication more than in the original method
by Fuentes-Castaneda1. As an exchange, three large temporary variables of Fp12 are
only required, instead of four, reducing the amount of needed RAM.[37]
1Relatively inexpensive Frobenius operations and inversions are ignored.
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4.4.1 Cyclotomic Subgroups
The easy part of nal exponentiation has an important consequence. After the expo-
nentiation of the easy part, the element f becomes a member of a cyclotomic subgroup
GΦ6(Fp2) = {α ∈ Fpk | αΦ12(p) = 1}, where Φ12(p) = p4 − p2 + 1. Rewriting the easy
part, one obtains
(p6 − 1)(p2 + 1) = (p6 − 1) p
6 + 1
p4 − p2 + 1
=
p12 − 1
Φ12(p)
.
It follows that (f (p
6−1)(p2+1))Φ12(p) = f p
12−1 = 1, and thus f ∈ GΦ6(Fp2).
The elements of cyclotomic subgroups have several benecial properties; they especially
enable ecient formulas for squaring. In cyclotomic squaring formulas by Granger and
Scott [21], the elements are compressed during the squaring and then decompressed.
The method especially suits for the square-and-multiply process, as squaring can be
done sequentially without decompressing. It is especially useful as the hard part
requires costly exponentiations by the 128-bit parameter u.
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Chapter 5
Implementation and Results
The implementation of this thesis builds on the library provided by Unterluggauer
et al. [37], which targets the 32-bit Cortex-M0+ architecture. The proposed library
was built and analyzed on the nRF9160 development kit [32] equipped with the ARM
Cortex-M33 [3] microprocessor. The goal was to optimize the cycle consumption and
run time of the O-ate pairing for the given design and analyze the feasibility of the
usage in practice.
The use of a more capable, backwards binary compatible M33-architecture enabled an
optimization on the multiplication, giving a signicant speedup. Moreover, allocating
the heavy and frequently used routines on the RAM gives a slight improvement in the
performance.
In the rst section, an overview of the used library is given. The second section presents
the setup used in this implementation; the pairing parameters and the used hardware.
The third section presents the results along with a brief comparison. Fourth chapter
contains the discussion, analyzing the results, the situation of pairings in research and
further improvements. Fifth section covers the learning outcome of the thesis.
5.1 Overview of the Library
The library1 is written in C and supported with optimized assembly routines for in-
teger arithmetic. The target platform is 32-bit ARM Cortex-M0+. The Cortex-M
microprocessor family is optimized for constrained embedded platforms. The library
1Available in https://github.com/IAIK/pairings_in_c.
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provides a comprehensive set of routines for both pairing and elliptic curve-based cryp-
tography for Cortex-M based embedded platforms. It provides functions for the O-ate
pairing, as well as for multiplication and division of the pairing functions. The pro-
vided curves are BN2542 and BN158. The arithmetic is layered, as described in chapter
4. The library also provides several pairing-based protocols, for example, the Identity
Based Encryption (IBE) [11] protocol, as well as integrated tools for benchmarking
and analyzing.
The hardware requirements of the library are low; considerably below 100kGE3, which
is required in many related libraries. The library is designed to be applied for interac-
tive protocols, feasible for embedded applications, such as wireless sensor nodes.[37]
Three dierent hardware architectures are supported: a plain microprocessor platform,
a microprocessor with a multiply-accumulate instruction-set extension, and a CPU
with a dedicated hardware accelerator. The designated hardware, such as a drop-
in module or MAC instruction set extension provide signicant speedup but require
additional hardware development. The drop-in hardware utilizes separate arithmetic
units for eld computations and is memoryless and requires neither multi-master bus
nor direct memory access.[37]
The prime eld arithmetic is realized with SPS (Separated Product Scanning) variant
of Montgomery multiplication. The reduction step is always performed after the prime-
eld operation to ensure constant runtime, which provides side-channel security.[37]
5.2 Testbench
For this implementation, we chose the plain microprocessor design. The BN254 curve
was chosen i.e. the parameter u = −40800000 00000001h. The used elliptic curve is
y2 = x3 + 2, embedding degree k = 12 and the tower extensions as presented in 4.1.1.
The 64-bit parameter u satises log2 n(u) ≤ 256 and 3000 ≤ k · log2 p(u) ≤ 5000 which,
by the time of the article [10], correspond to a security level of 128-bit AES. However,
after the recent study [6], the security of BN254 fell to roughly 100 bits. The option
of BN158 was ignored, as it can be considered insecure.
As mentioned, the used platform was nRF9160 cellular IoT development kit (DK),
which contains 64 MHz ARM Cortex-M33 CPU, 1 MB ash and 256 KB RAM. The
experiment was carried out on actual hardware. It contains manifold connectivity;
2Where u = −262 − 255 − 1 as described earlier
3GE refers to Gate-Equivalents, which is a measure for the complexity of a digital circuit
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bluetooth, LTE-M/NB-IoT modem and GPS.[32]
The software uploaded to the DK was a minimalistic, bare-metal solution. It consists
of the CMSIS (Cortex Microcontroller Software Interface Standard) (version 5.7.0),
nRF SDK (Software Development Kit) (version 16.0.0) and the pairing library with
the integrated benchmark tool. The CMSIS is the HAL (Hardware Abstraction Layer)
for ARM Cortex based microcontrollers, providing the generic tool interfaces for in-
teracting with the CPU. nRF SDK in turn provides the rmware functionality for the
nRF on-board hardware, such as UART and memory controlling. The software was
compiled with the bare metal ARM gnu toolchain[4], with the O3 optimization level.
1 .macro mulacc
2 @ Fetch the l e a s t and most s i g n i f i c a n t 16−b i t s o f the input v a l u e s .
3 uxth r6 , r1
4 uxth r7 , r2
5 l s r r1 , r1 , #16
6 l s r r2 , r2 , #16
7
8 mov r0 , r6
9 mul r0 , r0 , r7 @ low ∗ low
10 mul r6 , r6 , r2 @ low ∗ high
11 mul r2 , r2 , r1 @ high ∗ high
12 mul r1 , r1 , r7 @ high ∗ low
13
14 l s l r7 , r6 , #16 @ Add the l e a s t s i g n i f i c a n t 32−b i t va lue s
15 l s r r6 , r6 , #16
16 add r0 , r7 , r0
17 adc r2 , r6 , r2
18
19 l s l r7 , r1 , #16 @ Add the most s i g n i f i c a n t 32−b i t va lue s
20 l s r r6 , r1 , #16
21 add r0 , r7 , r0
22 adc r2 , r6 , r2
23
24 mov r7 , #0
25 @ Set the car ry va lue s to be added to the next output element
26 add r5 , r5 , r0
27 adc r4 , r4 , r2
28 adc r3 , r3 , r7 @ Clear the carry−f l a g
29 .endm
Listing 5.1: The original multiply-accumulate unit for M0 design.
44
5.2.1 Optimizations
Two optimizations on the hardware level were conducted to accelerate the pairing com-
putation. Firstly, the big-integer multiplication was accelerated owing to the extended
instruction set of the used M-33. Secondly, the code of two frequently used functions
were allocated to the RAM to decrease the cycle consumption of the memory fetch.
The optimizations are presented briey in the following.
The assembler optimizations are designed for Cortex-M0 architecture which supports
32 × 32 → 32 multiplication. Therefore, the code needs to split the multiplication
into several parts to obtain the 64-bit output of two word-length integers. The mul-
tiplication and reduction with 128-bit values are carried out as numerous 32-bit mul-
tiplications that are chained in a multiply-accumulate fashion. The original multiply-
accumulate macro is depicted in Listing 5.1.
The Cortex-M33, in turn, is capable of performing direct 32× 32→ 64 multiplication.
As a result, the four multiplications and several shifts and additions could be replaced
with a single instruction umull. The resulting macro is depicted in the Listing 5.2.
As a result, the cycle consumption of the Karatsuba multiplication and Montgomery
reduction algorithms decreased signicantly. For instance, the cycle consumption of
Karatsuba multiplier reduced from 2380 cycles to 1400 cycles, which is around 41%
improvement.
1 .macro mulacc
2 umull r6 , r0 , r1 , r2
3
4 mov r7 , #0
5 @ Carry va lue s to be added to the next output element
6 add r5 , r5 , r6
7 adc r4 , r4 , r0
8 adc r3 , r3 , r7 @ Clear the car ry f l a g
9 .endm
Listing 5.2: Optimized multiply accumulate for m33
Initially, we aimed to utilize instruction cache as-is for a better performance. The
instruction cache is a fast memory between the processor and the main non-volatile
ash, allowing the CPU to execute code without wait states. Naturally, loading the
cache from ash has a delay, and thus instruction cache should be loaded with code,
that is used frequently. The instruction cache of nRF9160 has a size of 2048 bytes.[32]
However, after enabling it we observed no improvement in the cycle consumption, and
by proling the memory usage, there appeared to be numerous cache read misses. It
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appeared that the used algorithms exceeded the size of the cache, and the remaining
instructions had to be fetched from the FLASH, causing delay.
Therefore, we instead allocated two weighty and frequently used functions to the RAM,
which also enables instruction fetching without wait states. We placed the main multi-
plier  256-bit Karatsuba and the Montgomery reduction algorithms. The algorithms
take 3,170 bytes of RAM in total, which is under 5% of the total RAM in nRF9160.
As a result, the pairing computation decreased by 4 MCycles, which is roughly 12%
improvement.
5.3 Results
The improvements in the key operations of pairing are depicted in Table 5.1. The table
describes the cycle consumption in (i) the library built as-is4, (ii) with the optimized
multiplication, (iii) after the RAM-allocation, and (iv) the nal build, containing the
compiler optimizations. The percentages below present the total improvement gained
from optimizations. The squaring in GT corresponds to the ecient formulas in cy-
clotomic subgroups.
Table 5.2 presents the cycle consumption and run time of the additional operations
utilized in many pairing-based cryptosystems, in the nal setup. It contains the cycle
cost of a key-encapsulation protocol which is based on the Boneh-Boyen ID-based
encryption (as described in section 3.3). It gives an estimate of how costly an actual
actual cryptographic action might be5.
Table 5.1: The eect of optimizations in various arithmetic operations
Fp GT e(P,Q)
Add. Mul. Inv. Sqr. Mul. Pairing
Optimization (Cycles) (Cycles) (kCycles) (kCycles) (kCycles) (kCycles)
Initial setup 260 4,580 1,262 144 224 50,768
Optimized mul. 270 2,770 723 93 141 32,006
RAM allocation 254 2,270 595 80 120 27,211
Final 217 2,190 552 76 115 25,917
Improvement 16.5% 52.5% 56.3% 47.2% 48.7% 48.9%
4Without any compiler optimizations
5The referred Boneh-Boyen ID-based encryption is considered impractical for actual implementa-
tions due to its complexity
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Table 5.2: Time and cycle consumption of various pairing-related operations
G1 G2 GT e(P,Q) ID. based protocol
Mul. Mul. Exp. Mul. Div. Encaps. Decaps.
kCycles 8,086 19,367 39,189 35,471 40,998 63,964 35,581
Time (ms) 131 310 623 565 651 1,012 567
Table 5.3 presents the performance results of a single O-ate pairing and the memory
consumption of the pairing library. The identity-based encryption interface is not
counted in the memory mapping, as we only aimed to analyze the key functions for
O-ate pairing, and the pairing-based protocols. RAM memory contains the allocated
functions and the maximum stack usage within the library functions.
Table 5.3: Performance results of the pairing library
Optimal ate pairing
kCycles Cache misses (%) Runtime(ms) RAM (Byte) Flash (Byte)
25,917 0.45 410 5,386 15,946
5.3.1 Comparison and Analysis
Table 5.4 presents our results among a few other related ate pairing implementations
over BN254 curves: a smartcard design by Devegili et al. [17], the underlying library
we utilized, and a Rasperry Pi3 solution by Hajny et al. [22]. All the implementations
are embedded "plain microprocessor" designs.
Table 5.4: Embedded platform designs for optimal ate pairing over BN254 curve
CPU Freq. Runtime RAM Flash
Work Platform (MHz) (kCycles) (ms) (Byte)
[17] Philips HiPerSmart 36 90,462 2,513 <16,000 -
[37] Cortex-M0+ 48 47,643 993 2,828 18,116
Ours nRF9160, Cortex-M33 64 25,917 410 5,386 15,946
[22] Rasberry Pi3, Cortex-A53 1200 - 13 - -
The runtime decreased by over 500ms comparing to the original work. The runtime is
likely decreased by a factor due to the higher clock frequency of the M33. The most
signicant benet arises from the utilized single-instruction 32-bit multiplication. On
the other hand, the extended multiplication also increases the amount of required
gate-equivalents. The RAM usage is slightly larger but certainly not a bottle-neck.
The Rasberry Pi3 solution is not directly comparable, due to the clock frequency and
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bigger caches, but it is still a good reference. Also, the power consumption of the
Cortex-A family greatly exceeds the M-family.
The question of whether the pairing implementation in this form is feasible depends on
the used protocol and how frequently the pairings are required to be used. The recent
work of Rezaeibagha et al. [34] provides a secure and, by the time, the most ecient
ID-based signature scheme with a cost of one exponentiation, i.e. scalar multiplication
in G for signature generation, and two pairings for verication6. Within this setup,
assuming that G = G1, the signing and verifying would require 131 ms and 2·410 = 820
ms, correspondingly. Even with all the resources available, the presented setup could
perform only a few signatures or one verication per second. Considering a network
of multiple nodes requiring high integrity, authenticity, and non-repudiation between
actions, this doesn't suce. However, if an identity-based signature is used only to
authenticate when establishing a connection, the present delay should be in sensible
bounds. Such a situation could be a single sensor node joining a sensor network,
and identifying itself to the base station, e.g. a server. A digital "handshake" of few
seconds in the beginning of connection seems reasonable.
5.4 Discussion
The question of feasibility of our implementation is ambiguous  it depends on the
use-case. The current setup is not capable of highly interactive protocols, such as digi-
tally signing each frequently occurring action. For a more passive use, such as a single
ID-based authentication, the setup suces. Such a situation could be a device iden-
tifying itself to a server, which in turn has computational resources to verify multiple
signatures in a second.
The further improvement of our work could include the further optimizing of the
assembler routines. The ASM-optimizations of the utilized library seem to contain
mostly unrolled code, leading to larger-size algorithms. The nRF9160 might benet
from looped structures, as they could t better in the 2kB instruction cache. Also, the
M33 supports direct multiply-accumulate instruction to 64-bit output, which could
save some additions. Unfortunately, the instruction did not directly suit into the
pre-existing library as-is.
The trend for embedded, constrained pairing implementations, from 2015 onwards
seems to favor the usage of FPGA solutions or other hardware extensions. For instance,
6Excluding the setup- phase and parameter generation
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the work of Sghaier et al. [36] provides a 225 MHz Virtex-6 FPGA design for pairings,
capable of computing the O-ate pairing in 350 µs. In [2], the pairing is performed on
multiple platforms with 1.0-1.7 GHz ARM CPUs, having the run time between 3.4-
55 µs. A versatile pairing-based protocol would require either a sole high-frequency
CPU or customized drop-in hardware. The higher frequency CPU would be more
energy-consuming but easily deployed, whereas the FPGA solution requires a lot of
development time.
Another considerable issue is the used Barreto-Naehrig curve family. An improvement
found in Number Field Sieve (NFS), which computes DLP in Fpk , lowered the pair-
ing extension eld security such that BN curves with 256-bit primes p(u) correspond
slightly under 100 bits of security, instead of 128.[6] For 128 bits of security, a curve
with 384-bit prime p(u), for example, BN384, should be used. Moreover, the novel
Barreto-Lynn-Scott (BLS) curves seem to oer signicantly better performance than
BN curves, with the same security level. In fact, many research suggests that BLS127
is the most ecient (known) curve to compute the pairing. In [6], at the 128-bit se-
curity level, the optimal ate pairing with BN curves costs 17774m+ 4i, whereas with
BLS12, it costs 14028m+ 6i.
However, neither the code optimizations nor enhanced methodology for pairings would
signicantly increase the performance of this work; the pairing would still require a
few hundred milliseconds. A hardware improvement would certainly be needed to have
the capabilities for practical pairing-solutions.
7Curve over the extension eld, with k = 12
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
In this work, optimal ate pairing over the BN254 curve is implemented on the nRF9160
platform, endowed with a single 64 Mhz ARM Cortex-m33 microprocessor. An open-
source library is used, with optimized assembly routines to support the 64-bit multi-
plication of the m33 instruction set. As a result, the optimal ate pairing is eectively
computed in 410 ms.1 In practice, the resulting implementation is applicable for infre-
quent use, such as in the authentication process. The work shows that the full-extent
pairing-based cryptography for single-microprocessor ultra-low-power devices is yet
out of reach. A practical approach requires to include a hardware-accelerator, for ex-
ample, a customized FPGA. However, the devices with over 1.0 GHz microprocessors
seem to be capable of performing the pairing-based cryptography.
The pairing-based cryptography overall seems to be in a phase of continuous develop-
ment. The computation of Miller's algorithm and nal exponentiation constantly take
small improvement steps. The optimal ate pairing over BLS and BN curves seems to
have been established as the main tool for pairing-based cryptography. Many open-
source libraries exist for pairings, but it has not yet found its place as the part of larger
cryptography libraries, such as the OpenSSL or MBEdtls. Despite the improvements,
pairing-based cryptography will likely remain computationally heavy. The pairing-
based cryptosystems are also developed at an accelerating pace, getting more and
more optimized, as can be seen in comparison by [34]. Also, there doesn't seem to be
concern about their security; the basis is in the BDH-problem, and DLP over prime
and extension elds which have withstood for many years of security research.
The research on bilinear-pairings is clearly important, both in the general and the
embedded platform framework. The novel protocols can enable innovative and more
1Version available in https://github.com/mhspes/pairings_in_c.
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secure applications and might be a good response to the security needs for future IoT
applications, such as sensor networks, autonomous systems, and many other applica-
tions. The current research has already been promising but the pairings still need few
more years to stabilize its place in the cryptographic scene.
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